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homas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions1
presents a radical account of the process of scientific
change, and of the nature of science itself. The Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries serves as the model of what Kuhn meant as a
proper scientific revolution, and Kuhn focuses primarily on the
Copernican Revolution to illustrate this point. However, this
paper intends to illustrate one other transition within this period
that also supports Kuhn’s theory – namely, the transition between the natural philosophies of the Cartesians and the Newtonians. In particular, I would like to show how a number of concepts fundamental to each program are indicative of Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability between two competing paradigms,
which serve to prevent an intelligible link between both worlds.
Kuhn begins his approach to the history and philosophy of
science by rejecting the commonly held view of science as continually progressing, that each scientific theory builds upon preceding theories, edging always closer to the truth. Kuhn sees this
as far too simplistic an account of the history of science, and argues that there are radical and incommensurable discontinuities
between different episodes of scientific investigation which make
the idea of continuous progress untenable.
Kuhn sees the history of science as punctuated by radical in-
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tellectual revolutions that serve to overturn lengthy periods of
mere puzzle-solving. These periods of puzzle-solving are characterized less by independent and objective research than by adherence to prescribed assumptions and expected outcomes. During these periods of so-called “normal science,” curious or unexpected findings are brushed aside as irrelevant, since they do not
serve to confirm or support the current system of scientific theory. Therefore, research that serves to challenge current assumptions is most often viciously attacked and debunked or ignored
to the point of marginalization.
Kuhn refers to this system of dominant beliefs and assumptions as a paradigm. Paradigms “provide scientists not only with
a map but also with some of the directions essential for mapmaking. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory,
methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture.”2 According to Kuhn, only results which tend to strengthen
the current paradigm are accepted during periods of normal science. The paradigm itself is never criticized directly or challenged properly:
Closely examined, whether historically or in the
contemporary laboratory, that enterprise seems
an attempt to force nature into the preformed
and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm
supplies. No part of the aim of normal science is
to call forth new theories, and they are often intolerant of those invented by others. Instead,
normal-scientific research is directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that
the paradigm already supplies.3
However, Kuhn claims that when a paradigm fails to provide
adequate explanatory force for observed phenomena, or a new,
more powerful model has greater explanatory power, the paradigm reaches a crisis and is eventually overthrown by intellectual
revolutions. Thus, there is a “paradigm-shift,” in which a new
paradigm literally takes the place of an old one. Kuhn writes:
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the transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new
one from which a new tradition of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process one achieved by an articulation or extension
of the old paradigm. Rather it is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field’s
most elementary theoretical generalization as
well as many of its paradigm methods and applications. During the transition period there
will be a large but never complete overlap between the problems that can be solves by the old
and the new paradigm. But there will also be a
decisive difference in the modes of solution.4
As Kuhn illustrates, the Copernican Revolution is the quintessential paradigm shift: where an entirely new, heliocentric worldview replaced the old, Ptolemaic idea that the sun revolves
around the earth. During the period of the Ptolemaic paradigm,
scientists based their findings and interpretations upon the assumptions and predispositions provided by the Ptolemaic system of beliefs. Only when Copernicus – with the help of Galileo
– turned these beliefs on their heads could there be a proper
paradigm-shift.
Kuhn claims that paradigm shifts are similar to a religious
awakening or conversion, in that one paradigm replaces another
“not by deliberation and interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the gestalt switch. Scientists
then often speak of the ‘scales falling from the eyes’ or of the
‘lightning flash’ that ‘inundates’ a previously obscure puzzle,
enabling its components to be seen in a new way that for the first
time permits its solution.”5 Furthermore, “once a paradigm
through which to view nature has been found, there is no such
thing as research in the absence of any paradigm. To reject one
paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to reject science itself. That act reflects not on the paradigm, but on
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the man. Inevitably he will be seen by his colleagues as ‘the carpenter who blames his tools.’”6
An essential aspect of Kuhn’s theory is the notion of incommensurability, which serves to defy the notion that science progresses necessarily towards some ultimate truth. For Kuhn, the
rejection of a previous paradigm in favor of a completely new
one rules out the possibility of comparison. This explains the
problem that arises when two competing theories vie for the
minds of the scientific community, that there is a certain breakdown of rational argument and communication between adherents of competing programs. Kuhn argues that this is because
scientists working within different historical periods and different paradigms live in psychologically different worlds. As Kuhn
points out, “After Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different
world.”7 He means that when Ptolemy observes the sun, he observes an object that moves around the earth, whereas Copernicus sees the central star of the solar system – their viewpoints are
fundamentally incommensurable, in that the word “sun” means
something entirely different within each paradigm. Supporters
of either the Ptolemaic or heliocentric theories simply cannot argue in rational terms, since they are unable to argue about the
same thing – they each speak a different language with a different
conceptual vocabulary:
the Copernicans who denied its traditional title
‘planet’ to the sun were not only learning what
‘planet’ meant or what the sun was. Instead,
they were changing the meaning of ‘planet’ so
that it could continue to make useful distinctions in a world where all celestial bodies, not
just the sun, were seen differently from the way
they had been seen before.8
Therefore, for Kuhn, there exist deep conceptual gaps between
competing paradigms in science. Despite the fact that a scientist
can learn a new lexicon and become “bilingual” between two
competing paradigms, there is still no way of direct translation

The Natural Philosophies of Descartes and Newton

45

between them. As a consequence, one often has to use nonrational means of persuasion in order to convince an adherent of
one paradigm to adopt another.9
For Descartes’ mechanical philosophy, “everything in nature
is to be explained in terms of the size, shape, and motion of the
small parts that make up a sensible body.”10 Indeed, Descartes
would grant no other properties to matter than extension and
motion, and he essentially reduces all mechanics and physics to a
geometry of motions. In essence, Descartes’ mechanical philosophy treats the whole world as if it were a collection of machines,
as he outlines in the Principles of Philosophy:
I have described this earth and indeed the whole
visible universe as if it were a machine. I have
considered only the various shapes and movements of its parts.11
I do not recognize any difference between artifacts and natural bodies except that the operations of artifacts are for the most part performed
by mechanisms which are large enough to be
easily perceivable by the senses—as indeed
must be the case if they are to be capable of being manufactured by human beings. The effects
produced in nature, by contrast, almost always
depend on structures which are so minute that
they completely elude our senses.12
Men who are experienced in dealing with machinery can take a particular machine whose
function they know and, by looking at some of
its parts, easily form a conjecture about the design of the other parts, which they cannot see. In
the same way I have attempted to consider the
observable effects and parts of natural bodies
and track down the imperceptible causes and
particles which produce them.13
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In keeping with his mechanical conceptualization of the world,
Descartes even goes as far as to claim that the human body is
“nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which God
forms with the explicit intention of making it as much as possible
like us.”14 Therefore, as mechanics subsume physics, “everything
in physics now receives a mechanical explanation, that is to say,
everything is explained as if it were a machine.”15
Cartesian mechanical philosophy adhered to a form of corpuscularism in order to explain the nature of physical objects in
the world. This view is closely related to atomism in that it
claims that all physical objects – indeed, the entire universe –
were composed of small corpuscles of various sizes, although
corpuscles were seen as infinitely divisible, rather than being
theoretically indivisible on the atomic account. What was unique
in Descartes’ interpretation of the physical world was that he
claimed that there could be no void between particles. Instead,
Descartes argued that all matter was constantly swirling to prevent a void as corpuscles moved through other matter, thus the
notion of a “vacuum” was a meaningless term. Le Monde, or The
World, presents a corpuscular account of the universe in which
swirling vortices explain the creation of the solar system and the
circular motion of planets around the Sun, among other phenomena,. In The World, Descartes states that
when a body leaves its place, it always enters
into the place of some other body, and so on to
the last body…Thus there is no more a vacuum
between bodies when they are moving about
than when they are at rest. And note here that
in order for this to happen it is not necessary
that all the parts of bodies moving together
should be arranged exactly in a ring, as in a true
circle.16
In light of this view of the physical world, Descartes attempted to
explain the apparent “force” that causes objects to “fall” towards
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the center of the earth, obviously referred to as “gravitational
force” today. Garber highlights the importance of Descartes’ interpretation of gravity as a mechanical process:
If everything in nature is to be explained as if it
produced effects like a machine, then gravitation cannot simply be assumed; gravitation itself
must also be explained, and, within the mechanical philosophy, it must be explained mechanistically. Or, to put it another way, when mechanics
subsume physics, we can no longer appeal outside of mechanics to some distinct science to
supply necessary premises concerning heaviness: the premises necessary for doing the traditional mechanics of heavy bodies must come
from within the mechanical philosophy itself.17
In keeping with his notions that space is entirely composed of
various particles, that movement through space is merely a displacement of some particles with others, and that particles are
interpreted only in terms of size, shape, and motion, Descartes
claims that objects do not fall towards the earth as a result of any
gravitational pull. Instead, he claims that the tendency to fall toward the centre of the earth is a result of an “interaction between
a body and a vortex of subtle matter that turns around the
earth…bodies are pushed towards the centre of the earth by colliding with the particles of subtle matter in the vortex,”18 and that
“power which the individual particles of celestial matter have to
move away from the centre of the earth cannot achieve its effect
unless, in moving upwards, the particles displace various terrestrial particles, thus pushing them and driving them downwards.”19 His notion of heaviness is summarized as follows:
All the subtle matter which is between here and
the moon rotates rapidly round the earth, and
pushes towards it all the bodies which cannot
move so fast. It pushes them with greater force
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when they have not yet begun to fall than when
they are already falling; for after all, if they are
falling as fast as it is moving, it will not push
them at all, and if they are falling faster, it will
actually resist them.20

Therefore, Descartes’ conceptualization of “gravity” is provided in terms of size, shape, and motion alone, and fits within
his general conceptualization of the world as fully consisting of
various particles. In light of this, it is unsurprising that the Cartesian interpretation of gravity is based solely on the collision
between a heavy body and the particles of subtle matter. These
are mechanical processes, in that they are explained “in terms
one uses in explaining the behavior of a machine. In this way the
(spring-driven) clock or the planetary system…can be explained
by Descartes strictly in terms of size, shape, and motion of their
parts.”21
It should be noted that Newton’s account of the world is also
widely regarded as one that is based on mechanics. However,
what is important is the distinction between the term mechanics
within the two philosophies. As mentioned earlier, Descartes’
mechanics was a general view of the world as entirely functioning
as a machine; Newton, on the other hand, viewed the term mechanics as it is generally used today – it is the study of motion and
the forces that change it. Forces, in Newtonian terms, do not necessarily function in the same way as a machine, and therefore may
be explained in fundamentally different ways than they can in
Cartesian terms.
Newton’s greatest achievement was his theory of gravity,
from which he was able to explain the motions of all the planets,
including the moon. Newton proved that every planet in the solar system at all times accelerates towards the sun, and that the
acceleration of a body towards the sun is at a rate inversely proportional to the square of its distance from it. This, of course, led
to Newton’s law of universal gravitation, by which every particle
in the universe attracts every other particle in the universe with a
force that is directly proportional to the product of their masses
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and that is inversely proportional to the square of the distance
between them. Furthermore:
If a body be attracted by another, and its attraction be vastly stronger when it is contiguous to
the attracting body than when they are separated from one another by a very small interval;
the forces of the particles of the attracting body
decrease, in the recess of the body attracted, in
more than a duplicate ratio of the distance of the
particles.22
Newton claims that his theory explains:
That all bodies about the earth gravitate towards
the earth, and that in proportion to the quantity
of matter which they severally contain; that the
moon likewise, according to the quantity of its
matter, gravitates towards the earth…All bodies
whatsoever are endowed with a principle of
mutual gravitation.23
What is significant about this discrepancy between the two paradigms is the specific terminology or lexicon used by each paradigm in their respective accounts of gravity. Newton’s explanation of gravity in terms of a quality of a body of mass and an attraction between two bodies is fundamentally at odds with a Cartesian conception of gravity. For Descartes, as Garber illustrated,
when mechanics subsumes physics, we can no longer appeal beyond mechanics to some distinct science to supply the necessary
premises concerning heaviness – the premises necessary for doing the traditional mechanics of heavy bodies must come from
within the mechanical philosophy itself. Explaining gravitational force in terms of attraction does not fit within the Cartesian
paradigm of explaining phenomena solely in terms of size,
shape, and motion. As a consequence, Cartesian science simply
could not accept Newton’s “occult” idea of gravity as being an
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attractive force innate in bodies of mass. Considering gravity as a
universal force operating over empty space inevitably led to a
problem of how any force could act at a distance. For a mechanical philosopher like Descartes, nothing could act at a distance.
Rather, gravity must be talked about only in terms of a mechanical process – namely, as interaction between motion and particles.
Newton also claims to have rejected the Cartesian explanation of planetary motion in terms of vortices, arguing that the
Cartesian conception is missing a fundamental active principle
that is essential for the perpetual motion of a vortex:
Cor. 4. …in order to continue a vortex in the
same state of motion, some active principle is
required from which the globe may receive continually the same quantity of motion which it is
always communicating to the matter of the vortex. Without such a principle it will undoubtedly come to pass that the globe and the inward
parts of the vortex, being always propagating
their motion to the outward parts, and not receiving any new motion, will gradually move
slower and slower, and at last be carried round
no longer.24
Newton claims that the trajectory of planets is to be explained in
accordance with the Newtonian conception of gravitational force,
as opposed to any appeal to vortices (as evident in the Cartesian
interpretation):
The planets move in ellipses which have their
common focus in the centre of the sun; and, by
radii drawn to that centre, they describe areas
proportional to the times of description.25
That the moon gravitates towards the earth, and
by the force of gravity is continually drawn off
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from a rectilinear motion, and retained in its orbit.26
For Descartes, the only cause for motion is vortices; to speak of it
in any other way is to speak in essentially occult terms.
Within the Cartesian paradigm, there must be something
physical and sensible between two interacting bodies to influence
each other. Newton provides no such evidence:
Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of
the heavens and of our sea by the power of
gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of
this power… But hitherto I have not been able to
discover the causes of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses;
for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether
of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place
in experimental philosophy.27
Newton rejects the Cartesian conception of vortices by instead
appealing to gravitational force, but offers no cause of gravity –
merely that gravity is a force that is proportional to the product
of two masses and inversely proportional to the square of the
distance between the point masses, and as mentioned earlier, he
uses such anti-Cartesian terms as “attraction” to explain such a
relationship. Indeed, in Newtonian natural philosophy, there is
an apparent absence of causal hypotheses altogether.
For Newton, the cause of gravity is an unnecessary part of the
explanation of how gravity operates. Instead, Newton literally
turns the Cartesian methodology (the need for causal hypotheses) on its head – as well as its notion of gravity. Descartes sees
“gravity” as a “push” force, while Newton views “gravity” as a
“pull” or “attraction,” an inherent quality of bodies of mass.
These terms used within each paradigm, and the respective approaches to scientific problem-solving are so fundamentally in-
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compatible, so incommensurable, that they resist any forms of
translation, and thus the debate cannot be resolved by purely
rational means.
In addition to rejecting the Cartesian conceptualization of
planetary motion, Newton also dismissed Galileo's mechanical
theory of Earth tides in general favor of the Kepler-Gilbert theory, which holds that tides are caused gravitationally, primarily
by the interaction between the moon and the earth. Furthermore, Newton also rejected the Cartesian notion that all spaces
are entirely filled with particles and thus, there can be no void
between particles:
Cor. 3. All spaces are not equally full; for if all
spaces were equally full, then the specific gravity of the fluid which fills the region of the air,
on the account of the extreme density of the
matter, would fall nothing short of the specific
gravity of quicksilver, or gold, or any other of
the most dense body; and, therefore, neither
gold, nor any other body, could descend in air;
for bodies do not descend in fluids, unless they
are specifically heavier than the fluids. And if
the quantity of matter in a given space can, by
any rarefaction, be diminished, what should
hinder a diminution to infinity?
Cor. 4. If all the solid particles of all bodies are
of the same density, nor can be rarefied without
pores, a void, space, or vacuum must be
granted.28
However, if there is indeed a “fundamental conceptual gap”
between the two paradigms, how is it that Newton seems to be
able to argue against Cartesian mechanics so intelligibly? On the
contrary, although the argument may appear to have established
a bridge between the two paradigms, when given a closer examination, it only reinforces the conceptual gap between them.
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In order to refute the Cartesian conceptualization of “space,”
and the claim that there can be no vacuum, Newton appeals to
“density,” a property of a body of matter. However, in Cartesian
mechanics, there is no concept of “density.” Instead, “the nature
of body consists not in weight, hardness, colour, or the like, but
simply in extension.”29 For Descartes, matter has no other properties other than size or three-dimensional extension. In measuring the quantity of matter, a Cartesian only relies on the measurement of the surface area or volume and the relative amount of
three different sizes of particles. Bodies made up of a relatively
high amount of the smallest particles are less solid, while those
with a relatively high amount of the largest particles are more
solid. For a Newtonian, quantity of matter is “mass,” a calculation of density and volume; for a Cartesian, the notion of “mass” is
spatial extension, and nothing more. The “density” of particles in
a body of matter has no place in the equation; indeed, “density”
has no place in Cartesian mechanics. For Newton, mass is not
extension, yet extension is the only inherent property of matter
for Descartes. As a consequence, the Newtonian concepts of
“mass” and “density” are simply incomprehensible to a Cartesian. Thus, although it appears as though Newton argues
against the Cartesian claim that there can be no vacuum in space,
it is only through the use of terms that are fundamentally unintelligible to the Cartesian. Newton makes no attempt to refute
Cartesian mechanical philosophy using terminology within the
Cartesian paradigm, only that which is conceptually outside of it,
which dissolves any grounds for rational, intelligible argument.
What was particularly significant about Descartes’ program
was that he set out to provide an account of natural phenomena
through reason: in an a priori, deductive, synthetic methodology,
rather than purely through examination of empirical evidence.
Although there is a great deal of debate over the role of experience and non-mathematical evidence in Descartes’ natural philosophy, what seems to be clear is that Descartes held a priori reasoning, based on first causes or principles of nature established
through geometry or mathematics, to be paramount in scientific
inquiry. As Sakellariadis demonstrates, Descartes was particu-
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larly dismissive of empirical evidence presented to him by his
contemporaries that served to counter his own theories:
The burden of Descartes’ [letter to Mersenne of
18 December 1629] suggests that Mersenne sent
him some data that seemed to refute his theory…Referring to the measured acceleration of
the pendulum bob, [Descartes] wrote: “As for
the magnitude, I ignore it. And even if he can
make a thousand experiments to find it more
accurately, I do not have to take the trouble to
do them myself, if they cannot be explained by
reason.” No matter how clearly the results of
Beeckman’s and Mersenne’s observations differed from the predictions of Descartes’ principles, no matter how accurate or reliable the results, Descartes claimed that he was not constrained to consider them…unless the results
could be adequately explained by another, more
logical theory.30
Therefore, by and large, Descartes sees proper scientific theories
as being derivable through a priori reasoning, and consequently
to be held no matter what empirical evidence served to counter
them. In Kuhnian terms, Descartes has become entrenched
within a certain way of seeing things, in that he tends to see only
that which he expects to see. Only results which tend to
strengthen the current paradigm get accepted during this period
of “Cartesian normal science.” Indeed, it would seem as though
such rigidity may have served to cloud Descartes’ vision.
On the other hand, a scientific hypothesis or theory that relies
primarily on empirical evidence is, on the Cartesian paradigm,
simply an inadequate one. However, within the Newtonian
paradigm, even the approach to natural philosophy is fundamentally distinct from that of the Cartesian. As Newton proclaimed
during his Presidency at the Royal Society, the Newtonian
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program was to reinstate the significance of empirical evidence
in scientific inquiry:
Natural Philosophy consists in discovering the
frame and operations of Nature, and reducing
them, as far as they may be, to general Rules
or Laws – establishing these rules by observations and experiments, and thence deducing
the causes and effects of things.31
Newton’s empirical method claimed to provide the proper description of the relevant natural phenomenon and, in light of that
description, provide general principles that account for such phenomena. No a priori reasoning is necessary to account for natural
phenomena. Indeed, the Newtonian empirical method was intended to “loosen what Newton took to be the pernicious grip of
Cartesian notions within natural philosophy.”32 For Descartes,
empirical evidence alone can neither confirm nor disconfirm hypotheses; for Newton, they are essential for both. Clearly, the
two paradigms have distinctly incompatible criteria for what
counts as an adequately solved scientific problem.
To reiterate, according to the mechanistic scientific program,
all natural phenomena must be explained in terms of size, shape,
and motion. As a result, a scientist working within this paradigm must explain all natural phenomena, such as planetary motion or trajectories and gravitational force, in terms of various
collisions between small bodies making up the larger bodies of
everyday experience. The idea that things operate only through
the size, shape, and motion of their parts is not intelligible to the
Newtonian as it is to the Cartesian. Within the Newtonian paradigm, such mechanical explanations are misplaced, and are entirely unnecessary. Instead, as in the case of gravitational force,
one explains such natural phenomena in terms of an attractive
force between each body in the universe. There exists a significant incompatibility between the Cartesian and Newtonian conceptions of both “matter” and “space.” The foundation of Cartesian physics relies on the denial of the existence of vacuums or
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voids between or within particles. On the Newtonian conception, such denial does not exist; indeed, it is viewed as entirely
erroneous. When a Cartesian talks of “space,” his conceptualization is so fundamentally opposed to that of the Newtonian paradigm that it defies accurate comparison. “Space” for a Cartesian
simply is not “space” for a Newtonian – the same goes for
“matter,” “gravity,” and “planetary motion.” Thus there are serious difficulties in directly comparing or translating these competing conceptions; in other words, these terms are fundamentally incommensurable.
The consequences of such a fundamental conceptual gap is
great, as it is indicative of how the Newtonian system did not
build upon the ideas of the Cartesians, but rather reinvented the
nature of science itself – both the explanatory power of science
and its limits. There was no clear progression or improvement
from Cartesianism to Newtonianism. Instead, the Cartesian paradigm was quite suddenly discarded by scientists and replaced by
the Newtonian worldview:
[W]hile the standards of corpuscularism remained in effect, the search for a mechanical explanation of gravity was one of the most challenging problems for those who accepted the
Principia as paradigm…Unable either to practice
science without the Principia or to make that
work conform to the corpuscular standards of
the seventeenth century, scientists gradually accepted the view that gravity was indeed innate.
By the mid-eighteenth century that interpretation had been almost universally accepted, and
the result was a genuine reversion…Innate attractions and repulsions joined size, shape, position, and motion as physically irreducible primary properties of matter.33
Due to these fundamental gaps between the two worldviews,
the remaining supporters of the Cartesian paradigm were unable
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(though, in many cases, they were quite unwilling) to change
their own worldview and adopt the Newtonian program, and
thus became increasingly marginalized by the scientific community. The Cartesian paradigm, rather than being acknowledged
as deficient and accordingly improved upon, eventually died out
with the last of its supporters. Just as Kuhn claimed, the debate
between the two camps was not resolved by purely rational
means such as deliberation or subtle adjustments in light of new
findings. It was, rather, a relatively sudden switch creating a
new, widely held, distinctly Newtonian worldview.
As Garber has shown, it may be inappropriate to deny the
intelligible link between the Aristotelian and Cartesian paradigms. However, this is clearly not the case when analyzing the
Cartesian and Newtonian paradigms. As a consequence of opposing standards for what counts as an adequately explained
scientific quandary, as well as a fundamental conceptual gap between the two systems, there is no such intelligible link between
the Cartesian and Newtonian paradigms, which in turn provides
clear support for the Kuhnian theory of the nature of scientific
revolutions.
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